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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
4 February 1963

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Adenauer's Attitude Toward De Gaulle

25X1 The following [redacted] received
from [redacted] Our comments are
attached.

25X1 1. [redacted]
[redacted] Adenauer spoke
of the treaty with pride, saying he felt it was West
Germany's guarantee against a possible French move to
seek a separate arrangement with the Soviets. Further-
more, he said, the treaty gave West Germany the ad-
vantageous position of having a voice in both French
and NATO nuclear defense policies. He said French
President De Gaulle considered separate arrangements
with the Soviets necessary because of the US attitude
on defense matters. De Gaulle also wanted to reach
an agreement with the Soviets before the US did.
Adenauer attacked the US for having driven De Gaulle
to extremes by refusing to cooperate with him in
nuclear defense.

2. Adenauer said De Gaulle had told him that
the French president's reason for refusing to accede
to the Nassau agreement was because this agreement
deprived Europe of the ability to use the nuclear
deterrent as a counterthreat to any Soviet threat.
Any such counterthreat would, under the agreement,
require prior US approval. In these circumstances,
De Gaulle had said, Europe would not be able to speak
authoritatively in times of crisis or to determine
independently when Soviet threats were strong enough
to require counteraction. According to Adenauer,
De Gaulle claimed the Cuban crisis had shown the US

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ability to deal with problems in the western hemisphere in a determined way, which, in itself, was proof that the Europeans, too, could best deal with threats to Europe. Adenauer also said De Gaulle had been justifiably furious over the US trickery in the Nassau agreement of offering to supply only Polaris missiles for which the French had neither warheads nor submarines. Adenauer said De Gaulle thought the US move was a deliberate effort to humiliate France by demonstrating for all the world that the French were not ready for such weapons. De Gaulle had also told Adenauer that he did not consider the Polaris to be the ultimate weapon. De Gaulle thought this weapon, as well as long range bombers, might become obsolete, especially for the European powers which had the advantage of the element of surprise inherent in the relatively short distance between western Europe and the Soviet Union.

3. Adenauer [redacted] basically agreed with De Gaulle on the issue of British membership in EEC since the inclusion of Britain in the European Community would be another means for the US to dominate political decision-making in Europe. British membership in EEC would also, according to Adenauer, have serious repercussions on Europe's future role in Africa. He said the Americans were jealous over the strong French influence in Africa, as was evident in the current Congo crisis, and that the US wanted to reduce Europe's role on the dark continent. Adenauer said, however, that Franco-German cooperation in Africa was very promising and also desired by the Africans.

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COMMENT

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B. In respect to the passage in the current report dealing with Adenauer's views on the nuclear weapons issue, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Germany, of course, is not involved in the Polaris question, and Adenauer has enthusiastically supported the idea of the NATO multilateral force, in sharp contradistinction to De Gaulle. But in visiting De Gaulle and listening to the General pour out his woes about France's national nuclear position, Adenauer is most likely to be sympathetic.

C. In regard to paragraph 3, we have known that Adenauer does not really want the UK in the EEC, though he has had to go along with the overwhelming sentiment in Bonn in favor of British membership. The reasons given here for Adenauer's negative attitude should probably not be taken seriously. For one thing, Adenauer's policy has not been to eliminate US influence from the Continent. For another thing, the language of the report on this point is open to varying interpretation. Obviously no European statesmen wishes the US to "dominate" decision-making in Europe. Adenauer's more likely reasons for doubting the wisdom of British membership are that he is not convinced that Britain could ever work toward his cherished federation of Western Europe, and that he is worried about tendencies in the UK toward a "soft" policy in the event of negotiations with the USSR on central Europe.

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